

The Old Ruthenian¹ Struggle: Orthodoxy and the Unia in Austria-Hungary

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The position of the Orthodox in Galicia and western Ukraine has, since at least the middle of the 16th century, been one of endless misery, warfare, public humiliation and ritual degradation. Outside of Catholic Ireland, this sort of treatment over so long a period of time is almost unheard of. The story of the Old Ruthenians is extraordinary.

The “Uniat” church was a papal plan to convert the Orthodox in Poland. The Polish Confederations sought total Latinization and never trusted the Unia, but the papal idea prevailed.² For the uninitiated, the Uniats are a religious body using some Byzantine rituals while claiming loyalty to the Pope of Rome. It was a hybrid of some Catholic theology with some Byzantine ritual. It made no theological sense. It was forced upon a clueless Ukrainian population starting in 1595, though its antecedents go back further. Right up until the middle of the 20th century, many in Ukraine or Carpathian Rus' had no idea they were Papal Catholic and believed themselves to be Orthodox.³

Part of the reason why the Polish clans did not trust the Unia was that the Byzantine ritual would be a gateway to foreign loyalties. It would create a sort of “ghetto” where ritual, calendar and language would prevent any true assimilation to their civilization. They were correct. The Unia was imposed, but the nature of the Slavonic liturgy was the one remaining symbol that unified Galicia with Russia. This became the focal point of ethnic and religious resistance. In 1772, Galicia was brought under Austria-Hungary, though the local ruling class still were descendants of the old Polish gentry. Polish nobles and Jews took exclusive possession of Orthodox lands in Poland starting in the middle of the 14th century.

The Unia was imposed on Galicia due to ignorance. It was called “Orthodoxy.” Before the 20th century, the Orthodox Church was called the “Greek Catholic” and the Romans, of course, the “Roman Catholic.” Only more recently have the Uniats been called “Greek Catholic.” Part of this confusion permitted many Ukrainians to think they are members of the Orthodox church when they are not. Deceit was built into the project from the start and it was never meant to be permanent.

Preserving the purity of the Eastern rite and the Slavic worship in the Uniat churches of Galician Rus was an act of rebellion. It was a rebellion of Old Russia against the injustice of the Polish and Hungarian oligarchy. The Jesuits and Poles believed that the Uniat idea was a failure. They reasoned that so long as the Russian population of Galicia had the same service, calendar and rite (more or less) as the Orthodox people of Russia, it will remain alien to Roman

1 The terms: Russophile and Old Ruthenian are used here identically. On occasion, they are referred to as Galician Russophiles, Moscophiles, or more specific to a clerical group, the St. George Circle. Other than this latter, all these other terms refer to the identical ideology.

2 Thinking of the Polish empire as a monarchy with a single policy-making center is an error. In truth, “Poland” was a federation of noble clans who thought of themselves racially distinct from ordinary Poles.

3 This author is a former Uniat. The church where I was married had both Orthodox and Uniat members. It was clear that some did not know the difference or realize there was one.

Catholicism and unavailable for Latin propaganda. It will always lean toward Orthodoxy. Therefore, the Polish Jesuits decided to gradually introduce Latin and thus to destroy the Eastern rite gradually. This too failed. Worse, it created its opposite: In the middle of the 19th century, a pro-Russian movement emerged among the Galician Uniates and that movement is the subject of this paper.

Many new to this topic will be surprised that the Unia, of all things, was the breeding ground for Russophilism. The explanation is that this church was the only (albeit remote) Russian-style cultural emblem available to anyone in Austrian Galicia at the time. The liturgy in Slavonic and the Old Calendar became symbols of resistance against both Polish and Magyar oligarchs.

This also failed. The last resort was, in the final days of the Austrian empire, to accuse the Russophiles of treason and throw them into prison. The Viceroy of Galicia, Alfred Potocki, was summoned to Vienna in the middle of the 19th century where he was ordered to convert the entire Orthodox population of the empire to Rome (that is, to pure Latinization). Potocki in vain argued with the Emperor that such a policy was absurd and would require a tremendous outlay of scarce resources. Vienna had the idea that Orthodoxy and the Old Ruthenians were both pro-Russian and hence, capital crimes. As a result of its national consciousness in belonging to the broader Russian nationality, the Rus remained pro-Russian. This too failed.

The Trauma of 1848

During the Masonic Revolutions of 1848 the higher clergy of the Uniat church in Galicia (including Bishop Gregory Yakhymovych, Michael Kuzemsky and Michael Malynovsky) played a very important role in the Slavic-national movement. Its political expression for a time was the Supreme Ruthenian Council. This revolt attracted local Polish strongmen as a means to resurrect the old Polish oligarchy as an independent entity. The consequence was that their Ukrainian and Ruthenian opponents stayed silent. The Rusyns had no interest in this since it would have led to the continued exploitation of the locals at the hands of Polish foreigners. This occasioned the local uprising of Ruthenian peasants against Polish landlords who had been exploiting them for centuries. Vienna was not entirely opposed to this, since they were as worried about an independent Poland as Russia was. Due to Russia's smashing of the arrogant Magyar oligarchs, pro-Russian sentiment spread among the Rusyns of Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia. They remained loyal to the Austrian crown throughout the revolution. This is in part because Vienna had been important in the Uniat moment and, far more significantly, that it was sure protection from both Poles and Magyar oligarchs. These were the enemy. Vienna was seen as an ally – unstable and unsure, but an ally. This ally rapidly turned against them.

Under Metropolitans Spyrydon Lytvynovych and Gregory Yakhymovych (mentioned above) the canons of the Lviv cathedral chapter became known as the St. George circle. The Old Ruthenians, based at the Cathedral of St. George, developed a huge publishing enterprise. Along with it, substantial construction of reading rooms, schools and charitable associations maintained a continuity of tradition with Old Rus. These were directly and explicitly aimed at the peasantry.

The Russian Folk Institute in Lviv was founded in 1852 solely from public donations. The “House of the People” contains a public library which had more than 50,000 volumes, the Museum of Antiquities and Arts, a boarding school for Russian students and an educational institution for girls. They built the magnificent Church of the Transfiguration. They also provided grants and scholarships to Russian students attending Austrian and foreign universities, as well as the Academy of Fine Arts and music conservatories. For a fairly poor institution in one

of Europe's poorest regions, it was an impressive enterprise.

Thus, as the Revolutions of 1848-1849 shook the already fragile Austrian state. Russian intervention under Nicholas I saved the Austrian crown that had already fled Vienna. Austria thanked Russia by becoming its most implacable enemy. Vienna maintained power by playing one ethnic group against another to maintain a balance. Given a modicum of freedom once Russian forces withdrew, they saw their chance to dominate the area. The weaker the crown, the greater latitude the local strongmen would have. This forced the Ruthenians to build their own organization and look to both Vienna and Russia for assistance, preferably the former.

Vienna sent Governor Earl Galicia Franz Stadion to keep the balance between the two ethnic forces in Galicia. He encouraged the Russophile movement and helped put together the Central Ruthenian Council headed by the Uniat Bishop Gregory Yakhymovych and helped launch the newspaper *Zorya Halytska* in Lviv.

The Ukrainian movement, by contrast, sought an independent and integral Ukraine. This idea of an independent Ukrainian state threatened the integrity of both the Russian and Austrian empires. Russophilism was as important to both Vienna and Petrograd as Ukrainophilism was a threat.

In the Transcarpathian region, the Rusyn national identity was seriously threatened by a Magyarization policy pursued by the Hungarian half of the empire and supported by the oligarchy. This distinction should be made clear: Transcarpathia was claimed by the Magyar nobility while Galicia was still seen as Polish by those nostalgic about the old Confederations. The Rusyn movement was destroyed there fairly quickly at the turn of the century.

The worst possible event occurred in the 1860s when Austria received a constitution and parliament. This entailed the crown land of Galicia became "autonomous," which meant that it came under the domination of the Polish gentry. This was a nightmare. The Rusyn peasantry was placed under a de facto serfdom far harsher than anything they had known. It was as if the 16th century was brought back. Jews were again used as means of credit and their legendary hate of Slavic Orthodoxy again oppressed the peasantry. All parties in the region admitted to the rapid use of debt as a means to enrich Jewish landlords to whom more and more land came under their control.

One German economic report, from one B. Seigel, on the area drew this response from Osip Markov, a Russophile leader:

We wanted to, so that is a danger that extends from the side of the Jews all Austria in general, and in our Galicia in particular, drew the spotlight and caused yet vigorous defensive action, because otherwise absorbing wave Jewish Christian population invasion deprived of parental property or transform it into slavery, homeless and homeless proletarians (Vaskiv, 2013).

The Uniat and Jesuit onslaught was so absurd that the Uniat metropolitan of Lviv, Joseph Sembratovych (1900) secretly maintained the Orthodox faith for 19 years while the head of the Uniat church in western Ukraine. It was so patently absurd that even the head of the organization abandoned it.

The return of the Chelm Diocese to Orthodoxy was the most significant action of the Russophile movement. To say the diocese "returned" to the Orthodox church is not a matter of opinion, since the Unia was imposed by force. JP Himka's analysis is flawed deeply when he

speaks of the Old Ruthenian warnings about Latinization as if they were mere threats. He says “The Russophiles feared that soon Iconostases would disappear from the Galician churches, as would the Eastern matins and vespers; one could expect to find organs and rosaries in their place.” This was not propaganda but policy: many Uniat churches in the area saw their Iconostases taken down and Latinization was the norm.

Himka also treats the idea of the Resurrectionists with some skill. His professional environment forbids anything too pro-Russian, but anti-Christian in general is always fine and therefore, he feels far freer in dealing with this bizarre sect. Historically, Catholicism has been anti-national. It has met the rise of strong states, ethnic or not, with great hostility. There are exceptions, and these are almost always ethnic groups close to Orthodox nations. Poland and Croatia are two well known examples. The Resurrectionists are a political body with a strongly religious veneer. Its purpose was to take Ruthenians under the guise of the Unia (some received “permission” to use the Byzantine Rite for this purpose) and slowly remove any concern for the Old Calendar and the Cyrillic Alphabet. These are, as always, to be taken broadly. They refer to the Polonization of the church overall, and are not merely restricted to those issues. Language and time are the real targets.⁴

Regardless, the Russophile leaders such as Denis Zubritsky, Bogdan Didytskyy, Ivan Naumovich, Michael Kachkovskyy and Adolf Dobriansky saw the Russian monarch as the only power that had the means to drive out the Jews and Poles. It was Russian troops that, after all, had put down the Magyar “landlord putsch” in 1848. Increasingly weak, Vienna required the loyalty of the very forces destroying the Slavs in Galicia. The Dual monarchy appeared less and less viable as the decades wore on.

In 1866 Austria lost its war against a vibrant and unified Prussia. The Ruthenians had an opening to press their claims of a separate Slavic Orthodox (or semi-Orthodox Uniat) nation within the crownlands of Austria. The Old Ruthenians launched a war against alcohol, the traditional retail trade of the Jews. As the British subsidized anti-royal elements in Russia, the Russians gave some money to the Old Ruthenian movement. In 1870 they founded the Rus' Sobor and established the journals *Slovo* in 1861 and a theoretical journal *Scientific Thought* in 1874.

Old Ruthenian Ideas

One of the first Russophiles, N. Kmicykevich wrote in 1834 that the Russians were the same people from Western Ukraine to Kamchatka, from the White Sea to the Black Sea. There is, in other words, a single civilization. This cannot be overstated: in linking themselves with a broader civilization (as opposed to a single nation), this tiny nation of 2.5 million people was not part of a huge civilization structure. No longer seeing themselves as representatives of a small Ruthenian nation of under three million people, weak in comparison to its neighbors, the Russophiles now saw themselves as the westernmost branch of the Great Russian people. Politically, the Russophiles came to advocate the idea of a union between a “Galician Ruthenia” and Russia.

One of the most active of the Galician Russophiles was the prominent historian, nobleman Denis Zubrytsky, who helped convert many of the Galician elite to his cause. He was

4 Ironically, the handful of Resurrectionists remaining are now part of a church that believes in neither empire, nation or church. Their website features their missions in Africa, suggesting that they are being used to fill slots wherever they are needed. Every name on the 1999 General Chapter is Polish, however, suggesting that these men were convinced they were going to be a part of a Polish movement. History has not been kind to these erstwhile patriots.

also the first to begin writing in standard Russian: as early as 1849 he started his main work, *The History of the Ancient Galician-Russian Principality*. In a letter to his friend Mikhail Pogodin, Zubrytsky claimed that his stated purpose was to acquaint his Galician people with Russian history and the Russian language. Indeed, the historiography of the medieval Kingdom of Galicia–Volhynia was largely begun by Galician Russophiles and served as the basis for their nation-building project (in contrast, the Ukrainophiles at that time focused on the history of the Cossacks). In terms of literature and culture, the Russophiles promoted Nikolai Gogol and Ivan Naumovich in contrast to Ukrainophile emphasis on Taras Shevchenko.

In terms of language, Galician Russophiles were strongly opposed to the adoption of the vernacular Ukrainian language spoken by peasants and instead supported the adoption of standard literary Russian. This opposition was such that they even welcomed the ban on the Ukrainian language in the Russian Empire in 1876. Reflecting their belief that the people of Ukraine played a special role in the development of the greater Russian nation, the leading Russophile thinker Ivan Naumovich declared that the Russian language was derived from “Little Russian” and was only being readopted in Galicia. Indeed, Galician Russophiles wrote that one of the reasons for all East Slavs to adopt the Russian language was that the modern Russian language had been created in the 17th and 18th centuries by scholars from Ukraine. The early Russophiles saw the language spoken in Galicia as comprised of four elements listed in order of importance: Traditional Slavonic, German, Polish and Turkic. Without this, Magyar expansionism could not be resisted.

Fr. Ivan Naumovich, initially a Uniat priest, but a later convert to Orthodoxy, was an essential figure in this movement. He argued for the essential unity of all eastern Slavic peoples who he regarded as one Russian nation. He argued that the Galician, Kievan, Muscovite and all the other labels refer to a single Russia. As he sought the gradual conversion of the Unia to Orthodoxy, he was excommunicated in 1885.

He was the founder of numerous journals, charitable societies and reading rooms. His main concern was to the Galician peasant, the stock from which he sprang. Vehemently he condemned vodka drinking and the Jews that profited from it. His program for the peasants had three simple goals: first, a public school in every village that is a part of the church structure, second, public libraries for folk literature and strong economic cooperatives for the sake of economic growth.

He sought to purify the Byzantine rite from all Latinizations, stressing the pan-Russian nature of Galician Slavs. The stress on language was also accompanied by the insistence that Galician should become literate in Russian. The Latinization of the Uniat rite had become extreme. The iconostasis was often absent, icons were not done in the traditional style, portraits of Polish nobles were hung in the church rather than icons, prayers arbitrarily changed, mixed Latin and Slavonic chant and other absurdities that led to there being almost no coherent liturgical life among the Uniats.

Metropolitan Gregory Yakhymovych sympathized with this movement, but both Polish elites and Rome rejected it. He was called a “schismatic” for seeking the pure Byzantine rite. Under pressure from Rome the Metropolitan told Fr. Ivan to cease his activities in 1862. The sympathetic metropolitan died suddenly shortly thereafter, almost immediately after promising to convene a council to deal with the question of ritual.

By 1878, Fr. Ivan and the Russophiles had gone too far for Vienna. He called for the slow abolition of the Unia due to its connection to the “gentry and Jesuit persecution of the Galician nationality” He was convicted of treason in 1881 and sent into exile. Magyar fanatics tried twice

to kill him and only once wounded his son accidentally.

In the political realm, Adolf Dobriansky wrote the “Draft Program for Russian Austria” (1871) and warned of the inevitability of war with Russia and possibly with a reunited Germany. He rightly pointed out that only a strong Russia, in a firm alliance with an Orthodox-Slavic bloc in the Balkans, was able to resist its enemies.

Carpatho-Rus was deliberately kept poor by the Magyar oligarchs for raw materials. There was nothing the peasants lost by their acceptance of national movements. About 100% of the Uniats ready to become Russian Orthodox by 1917. In 1897 Count Kasimir Felix Badeni slaughtered peasants as the governor himself went to the ROC.

Himka's analysis of these events derives largely from his professional restrictions. Russian Orthodoxy is, for both right and left, a forbidden, “backward” religion that is the antithesis of liberalism. The claim that “peasants” resisted the “purification” of the rite is absurd. He never tells us what this “purification” was. The Unia has always been associated with landlordism and Jewish control. Himka ironically claims that the “Russian government imposed the union by force.” Without question, the loyalty of the peasantry to Polish landlordism and the killings of Count Kasimir knew no bounds. Such stupid statements are part of the price of his high position in academia.⁵ Needless to say, the mass conversions of St. Alexander do not get their own chapter heading in Himka's work. Empires are not nation states, Galicia was not a part of Russia in the same sense that Florida is a part of the US. Russia had no ability to use force in Galicia at the time. These are empires, not states.

St. Alexander Hotovitzky (1877-1947) was former Uniat. As the obnoxious tyranny of Magyar and Pole was too excessive to be ignored, conversions to Orthodoxy were everywhere. He baptized more than 200 nobles, professors and roughly 1400 peasants. St. Alexander had to flee to Athos. He rejected the Ecumenical Patriarch and ecumenism. He believed Stalin was Orthodox and asked him for help. Like many at the time, he was taken in by the propaganda of the Moscow clergy and was given bad information.

The ideology of the movement rejected both the Ukrainian Autocephalous idea and the New Calendar church. The result is that the Old Ruthenians went to Czechia. The Russophiles were not opposed to Ukrainian nationalism, but supported it as part of a common fight against Magyar and Polish hatred. Famously, Orthodox convert Ivan Naumovich improved upon the infrastructure of the St. George circle. An agrarian populist, a major preoccupation of this movement was the destruction of alcoholism.

Centrally, the village and its cohesion was the only strength of the Rus' people there. If that was to fall, genocide would have become a fact. The basic notion from Adolf Dobriansky was that all Ukrainians and Carpathians should be under a single Orthodox Church. He was formally a Uniat, but like the metropolitan, rejected the fiction. Slavonic was deliberately being neglected under Latinization.

Austria Snaps

Conrad von Hötzendorf, German nationalist commander of the Austrian infantry on the eastern front went to war with the “treasonous Russophiles” in the early months of the First World War. He wrote:

5 Himka suggests the very same motivation for “Galician emigrants” helping in the conversion to Orthodoxy (pg 59). A quick glance of Professor Himka's foundation grants suggests that he is not adverse to going on the payroll either. Only in academia can this be considered something to brag about.

Based on the increasing number of reports of treasonous Russophile activities in Galicia, order Op. No. 221 was issued to the 11th Army Corps to urge the City of Lviv to dissolve the Russophile associations and to make arrests. The seed that was allowed to grow rampantly in peace has now begun to sprout to the great disadvantage of our troops and military interests—only drastic measures could help now (quoted from Dornik, 64).

Thalerhof was the concentration camp used for this purpose as “Russophiles” were rounded up. Austria, largely responsible for the war, was one of its weakest participants. She quickly was put out of commission by the Russians, forcing Germany to divide her forces. This is what created the trench-stalemate that claimed so many lives. Only when Lenin took Russia out of the war did Germany then begin winning against the west. Before that happened, however, concentration camps were set up for Russophiles. Dornik writes:

The statistical analyses of the deaths at the Thalerhof camp suggest that it was not the particularly pro-Russian population that was supposed to be neutralized but rather the “Ruthenian”/“Ukrainian” intelligentsia. This reflected less an immediate security need than a long term ethnic conflict, in which the army leadership allowed itself to be instrumentalized for the purposes of local ethnic hegemony. (Dornik, 64-65)

Their view of history was Kiev to Galicia, a tendency today associated with the Ukrainian movement and Hrushevsky. Moscow was the synthesis of both (as Suzdal was allied with Galicia against Kiev) and today, the reduction of Russians under Polish influence. The rise of nationalism was to end this.

Hungary forced Magyarization in Carpathian Rus right after 1848. Vienna, however, stayed on the side of the Slavs as a means of balancing Hungary. Adolf Dobriansky (1817-1891) and Alexander Dukhnovych were panic-stricken that, after Russian troops left, Hungarians would engage in genocide in revenge. This was done, but it had to wait until World War I. They sought a “Magyar-Rus” as an autonomous entity.

Franz Joseph was well disposed towards the consolidation of Carpatho-Rus outside of Magyar control. Polish and Jewish money, however, seemed to have won the day. Yet again, the 1860 Constitution, as all forms of liberalism, masked a much harsher reality: it empowered only those that already had power. It led to the breakdown of the autonomous Carpathian state and Magyar oligarchs descended on defenseless Rus.

Magyar oligarchy – one that had maintained serfdom despite legal prohibitions – saw conversions to Orthodoxy as identical with treason. More specifically, it would give peasants a firm foundation for rebellion against their lords. The “treason trials” of 1913-1914 were the first shot in World War I on the eastern front. Prime Minister Tisza had personally fought this movement in Subcarpathia. He advocated the total assimilation of these peasants to Magyar life by force. In the dissertation by Joel Brady, he makes a compelling argument that the Russophile movement was a spur to Magyar enthusiasm for war with Russia (Dornik, 431).

It was clear that Vienna and the Magyar oligarchs saw conversion to Orthodoxy and the Russophiles as a military and diplomatic attack on Austria. The state press in Magyar and German territories referred to the “Slavic flood” subsidized by Petrograd as a means of conquest. The press, as usual for the time, went insane: conversions were part of a military assault that

included the killing of the Archduke. Russian espionage was preparing a massive invasion of Galicia to “destroy civilization.” In lockstep, newspapers in London, Vienna and Berlin – many Jewish owned – demanded war as a fight between Enlightenment and Slavic barbarism. When the war broke out, mass arrests by Hungarian authorities, fully supported by London, had already been planned. Truth be told, the first wave of arrests was already in the Spring of 1912 (Brady, 2013).

When the Austrian empire declared war on Russia, a substantial detachment of troops quickly rounded up roughly 30,000 citizens of Galicia and Bukovina and were sent to Talerhof as well as other lesser camps such as Theresienstadt and Kufstein. There was even one named Spielberg. The Orthodox faith was officially outlawed for the duration of the war in this regions. In Iza and Novobarovo, all Orthodox books were confiscated, and any Orthodox believer was fined between 50 and 100 were imposed fines of 50 to 100 marks. Amazingly, several villages, converted en masse to Orthodoxy as a result. Russophile papers were not stupid enough to say which ones, but speculation is that formerly Uniat villages Lypcha and Tereblya were the leaders in this respect and St. Alexander (Kabaljuk, 1875-1947) was the catalyst.

Prior to the war, St. Alexander converted almost 20,000 Carpathians from Uniatism. Hounded by the Magyar elite, he fled to America where he performed the same feats. Returning to Galicia, he was quickly arrested and tortured. Metropolitan Antony (Khrapovitsky) was an essential patron in his work.

Conversion was made more problematic also in more abstract ways, since this was the time of the introduction of the new calendar. St. Alexander refused its introduction though Constantinople had the temerity to appoint a bishop to ensure compliance. The worst was yet to come. Believing that Stalin was a supporter of Russian Orthodox nationalism abroad (this sort of disinformation took various forms and led to great confusion), St. Alexander asked for assistance in securing the survival of Carpatho-Rus by connecting it to the USSR.

The Uniat Bishop Anthony Papp sent a letter to Vienna saying that the Russophile movement is little more than Pan-Slavic propaganda. He wrote: “In Maramorosh you need to arrest them. Our border troops should forbid any Pan-Slavic leaflets. Make sure to destroy any active foreign pilgrimage centers.” This was one of the reasons St. Alexei had to leave the area.

The 80th Infantry Regiment of the Austrian Army first rounded up peasants who refused to fight Russians. Ending in 1917, Vienna created several court cases that tried the “ringleaders that included D. Markov, V. Kurylovich, K. Bogatyrets, I. Tsurkanovich and many others, who were dutifully sentenced to death.

When the war broke out, Vienna panicked. Of all the Europe combatants, Austria was the worst off. They were defeated twice by the exhausted Serbian forces in the battles that started the war, and it took a third time, plus Germany and Bulgaria to finally break them. They collapsed in 1915, which forced the Germans to buttress the region, ensuring the war would drag on.

As always, the main threat is identity. This had to be broken. When it collapses, there is no grounds for rebellion. The Ukrainian movement was hesitantly supported (since Poles were upset by this) and the Uniats were totally politicized as a tool of Ukrainianization. Any Russophile was a de facto traitor, and large-scale repression was begun. All Russophile groups were shut down. According to one contemporary:

[A]t the very beginning of the war the Austrian authorities arrested almost the entire Russian intelligentsia of Galicia and thousands of peasants; these were rounded up and transferred to administrative and military prisons. . . . It is

sufficient to be merely suspected of any sympathy for Russia, Russian culture, reading Russian papers or even a recent a trip often led to an arrest (Rudenko, 2014).

Talerhof was the result of this policy and was the first camp that can properly be called “concentration” with all that implies. It existed solely for Russophiles and had roughly 6000 inmates in 1914. Until the winter of 2015, there were no living quarters, and inmates would just sleep on the ground. Later it was expanded for other sorts of “offenders.” In the Carpathian region, the practice – to save time – was to arrest villages rather than individuals. The press was state controlled but not state owned. Daily it screamed that the Rusyn are spies for Moscow. In villages such as Tsunev, Ottengauzen, Pidzamche and Verechka Bereg, extra-judicial raids were carried out, where hundreds were shot without trial. The above villages were razed to the ground.

The worst offenses were in the Spring of 1915 when the Russians had to temporarily evacuate Galicia. Once occupied, the Magyar forces sought to exterminate all Russophiles. The entire region was neatly divided between Ukrainophiles and Russophiles. The latter were slated for immediate liquidation due to their “treason.” It was shut down after the death of the Emperor Franz Joseph in May of 1917. Charles I, the very temporary successor, fully admitted in his rescript of May 7 1917 that “all the arrested Russophiles were innocent in that they were taken only because of their background.”

Murders from the Magyar repression of the Ruthenian population are certainly under 100,000, but probably more than 40,000. This is the general parameters given the present state of the literature. A Polish member of the parliament in Vienna, D. Dashinsky, stated 60,000 were murdered.

Conclusions

In the middle of the 19th century, the Rusyns of Galicia and Carpatho-Rus were some of the poorest in Europe. Other than the Irish, few peoples have suffered so much with so few noticing. The elimination of serfdom in 1848 in these regions under Austria meant that peasant holdings were much smaller and their taxes higher. A high price was paid for the benefit of being called “formally free.”

In 1785 the law said that rural land was on the indivisible. It was a means to protect private property. From 1850-1868, the penetration of the market and the monetized economy meant that land was up for grabs and soon, it was dominated by an alien oligarchy. One had the “right” of free contract. In practice, it meant that usury ruled and you worked long hours to service the interest on your debt.

Russophilism was a response to both the arrogance to the imperial ambitions of Poles and Magyars as well as a protest against the institutionalized poverty of the Galician Rusyns. Russia was seen as the only way that these groups could be attacked. Serfdom was not nearly as harsh on Russians as it had been under Poles. Uniats, always seen as second rate, reminded the world that the Unia was a failure (Subtelny, 318). Russia was growing into an immense, wealthy and socially just empire, especially when contrasted to the Magyar oligarchy in Carpatho-Rus.

It was a movement that stressed a singular Russian culture from Siberia to Hungary. This tiny, oppressed and almost totally unknown people have a strong patron after all. This is what gave Vienna such nightmares. Contrary to writers such as Subtelny however, the Russophiles were populist, communal and egalitarian. They stressed radical moral reform and ultimately, a break with Uniatism. Subtelny writes: “Consequently, the Russophile camp was preserved from

complete disintegration largely because of support from Tsarist officials and Polish landowners.” Its as if he puts such stupid statements in his books to make sure students are paying attention. The work of the Russophiles received some money from St. Petersburg. All political movements had their patrons at the time. Galicia was depressed and poverty-stricken. For him to act like these subsidies were a sign of corruption is a bit like calling the kettle black: Dr. Subtley received many foundation grants in his life from Old Money Foundations and powerful economic elites.

On the other hand, he redeems himself with comments such as these:

The Poles, that is to say, their nobility and intelligentsia – for the Polish peasantry was almost as politically naive as the Ukrainians – were a frustrated people. In the late 18th century, they had been robbed of their statehood and when they rose up to regain it in 1830 and in 1863, their revolts failed dismally. To Ukrainians they may have appeared as arrogant, overpowering opponents, but many Poles were obsessed with their own weakness vis-a-vis the Germans and Russians. After the disaster of 1863, a major shift occurred in Polish thinking, and Goluchowski was a major proponent of it. Rejecting revolutionary activity as counterproductive, Polish leaders propagated a policy of “organic work:” concrete (if mundane) activity that would strengthen Polish society by modernizing it. The conditions were exceedingly favorable for implementing such an approach in Galicia, which therefore, came to be viewed as a Piedmont or base from which the regeneration of the Polish nation would begin (Subtleny 317)

Trying to peer into the minds of one's historical subject is difficult. Rarely can a good argument be made that begins with some belief that people you dislike have some mental illness. In this case, however, it would. The Polish press was loaded with ideas concerning the creation of a state. It never existed before, since Poland was a set of aristocratic alliances and confederations and was not a “state” or even an “empire” in the normal sense. However, being a modern state would also have to deal with their former colonial subjects such as the Ukrainians. The old Sarmatian ideas however, seemed to have seeped into the new ruling class, as Ukrainians were treated no differently than before.

From 1850 on, the Ukrainian population was terrorized and reduced to utter poverty. The bloodthirsty reaction to this animalization is interpreted today in Poland as “genocide of Poles in Galicia.” Unfortunately, the reactions of former colonial subjects usually do not have the same moral disapprobation as the actual cause of these reactions. In Transcarpathia, on the other hand, the situation was far worse. Of all the European oppressors of the Slavs, no one was as skilled as the Hungarians. The Rusyn population was about 500,000 at the time and were seen as slaves – often de jure – of the Magyar elite.

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