

The Paper Tiger Tries to Roar: The American Elite's Obsession for War against Russia and its Consequences

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As this author wrote as early as 1998, the west will stop at nothing to provoke Russia into a war. NATO has mobilized its reserves. It is trying to force Finland and Sweden to end their neutrality. Anders Rasmussen, former NATO chief, says Russia is more dangerous than the USSR.

This author has remarked elsewhere that the USSR, despite many pious sounding laws to the contrary, never saw and real sanctions placed on its trade. Even prohibitions on sensitive technology was still forced through the US court system. At no time in the so-called "Cold War" did the US show such bellicose behavior as it does presently, showing that it is nationalism, not Marxism, that concerns the US then and now.

The propaganda demonization of Russia and Putin, paralleled with a rapid buildup of western military forces, is nothing other than a preparation for a war that no one in the west wants. The US created the USSR and throughout its history, capitalism profited handsomely from the Socialist paradise. However, today, Russia has rebuilt an economy independent of the west and allied with China. War is easily predictable and will be forced on the bankrupt, alienated and exhausted American public.

The problem for the US is that Russia is not alone. The US has few allies upon which it can count. Russia presently has China and the whole membership of the SCO as well as most of the Third World including India. China is preparing for war against both the US and Japan. The SCO Alliance is a major threat to American hegemony. Add to this North Korea, and the US is in no position to engage in any war of attrition against Russia. This essay is a description of why the US will lose this confrontation: her military forces are weak, corrupt and pampered. The swaggering, arrogant and ultimately, poor fighters with poor leadership will be defeated. One of the many myths of our age is that the American armed forces are generally superior to all-comers.

One reason for this myth is the endless American capacity to lie. For example, in the early days of the Iraq war, January 17 - March 1, 1991, the US lost about 10,000 men and 60 tanks. This is the reason so many reserve units were called up. Failing to encircle and properly engage the Iraqi forces, Saddam Hussein was left in power. Only the Russian press at the time reported this.

In May and June 2003 there were 20 daily attacks on Americans. By the end of summer, that number has grown to 100 and by the end of autumn, more than 200 a day. The US had failed to pacify even the immediate vicinity of the major cities. From 1991 to 2003, 30,000 Americans were killed in Iraq. All nations on the planet accepted that number as true except the Americans.

Michael Munk reports from the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count that the total number of killed, wounded or missing, as of late 2007, is just over 50,000. Yet, these numbers are regularly

disputed (Munk, 2007). As early as 2004 we read:

The Landstuhl facility, located near the huge Ramstein US airbase, reported on January 23 that the total number of US medical evacuations from Iraq to Germany by the end of 2003 was 9,433. The number of hostile and “non-hostile” wounded by that point listed by the Army was approximately 2,750 (Walsh, 2004).

And again, from the same article:

Mark Benjamin of United Press International (UPI) has been one of the more assiduous in pursuing an accurate total of the number medically evacuated from Iraq. On December 19, Benjamin reported that in response to a request from UPI the Pentagon had provided a figure of nearly 11,000 US wounded and medical evacuations—2,273 wounded and 8,581 medical evacuations (Walsh, 2004).

The Bush administration altered how combat deaths are tallied. In the new reckoning, a “death” is only real when the soldier was actually on the battlefield at the time. The Department of Veterans Affairs, as of May 2007, reported that the real number of combat deaths was 73,846, a number shockingly high. Strangely, there are 1,620,906 disability claims filed since the war began from deployed personnel both military and civilian (VA, 2007).

The main reason for high losses was the extremely low professional qualifications of military men from grunts to generals. In a photo dated July-August 2003 called “American checkpoint near Baghdad” shows this incompetence. The checkpoint is a rectangular hole five or six meters from the earthen wall around the edges. The height and width is about 50-60 centimeters. The total depth of the wall along with the shaft is about a meter. This strange construction can protect only from small-arms fire of small and medium caliber. Heavy machine gun fire will be successful with a bunker like this. Iraqi mortar attacks were successful against these poorly constructed redoubts. The Russian checkpoints in Chechnya were constructed of concrete block foundations and resemble a miniature castle. This is a major difference that cannot be ignored.

The preparation of the officers is partly to blame. Compared with the old Soviet military schools, the system of officer training in the United States is limited. 75 percent of American officers are not regular officers. They are graduates of civilian universities, institutes and colleges, that were trained by the military ROTC. In our terminology - military departments. Such a course of action in 1200 American universities. The curriculum in these totals 480 hours over four years, including 180 hours of the first two years of training and 300 hours over the next two years (Kolontai, 2013).

The situation is further exacerbated by the US Army for the quality of training of people arriving at the reserve officers training, and then one to the troops. The fact that the cost of education in American universities is very high, enrolling as reserve officers is a good way to finance an education.

As a result, the American officer corps by 75 per cent recruited from the limited non-sporting people from poor families. That is the basis for the officers is the intellectuals with financial, medical or other problems. The Army Recruiting Command says that of 32 million youths in America of military draft age (that is, from 17 to 24) about 4.3 million can be used in

the services. Of that almost 30 million people, almost 5 million are excluded due to a criminal record.. Another 2.6 million suffer from other diseases that do not allow them to join the ranks of the armed forces while the remainder – about 20 million – are not suitable in terms of their intellectual and physical development (ibid).

Officer Candidate School plays a relatively small role in the training of personnel officers. It produces annually maybe 500, which comes from the number of soldiers wishing to become NCOs. The total duration of training is about 3 months, then from there into combat arms officers' school, where they are trained in a specialty of 9 to 18 weeks (2-4 months).

In Tsarist Russia the training period was four months, and courses for junior lieutenants in the Soviet Union was six months. This is why US claims of “friendly fire” deaths is mythical – they are being hit substantially from their opponents.

The US Army is a powerful shock machine. She is able to destroy entire neighborhoods. However, a competent and well-organized defense is her doom. The US has a well-equipped, but poorly trained military force. Another example is the failure of the US-British air offensive in the period from August 2002 to March 2003. In this period, the Iraqi air defense knocked out about 200 American and British aircraft. It was an unprecedented number in the history of jet aviation.

During the air offensive, which lasted seven and a half months, the United States and Britain lost about 300 planes, 50 of them British. The Iraqi air defense units on the ground were not affected. England, which has normally about 300 combat aircraft, at the beginning of March 2003 she was left with only 110 workable military aircraft. The Iraqi air defenses, so long as it was centrally commanded, shot down anywhere from 3 to 5 US aircraft a day. This is a minimum since journalists were not permitted independent work in the field. Russian estimates suggest that it was more like 10-12 combat aircraft downed daily.

From 19 March to 4 April 2003, restricting the estimate to Baghdad alone, the Americans lost about 200 aircraft. While they also bombed on a daily basis as Kirkuk, Mosul, Tikrit and a number of other large cities that were part of the central zone of the air defense of Iraq and suffered comparable losses there (ibid).

These same air defenses, when they shot down Apache helicopters in large numbers, the media reported they were lost in a “dust storm.” As in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Serbia, and Iraq, American planes and helicopters were brought down effectively by 37-mm anti-aircraft guns.

On the ground, the American M-1 Abrams was damaged heavily by all types of Soviet anti-tank guided missiles, including the very first example of this type of weapon going back to the 1960s. Iraqi crews ripped up these arrogant Americans who thought they were invincible using old Soviet equipment of Korean War vintage without a response. The lie was predictable – it was “friendly fire.”

The result was a death toll of 14,000 Americans and 2,000 Britons killed during the first phase of the war from March 2003 to mid-April. Foreign military observers were quick to point to the very, very low intellectual level of the soldiers, officers and generals of the US army and the consequent lack of duty ethics.

Rather than pacify the substantial resistance once the political elites surrendered in exchange for easy terms, the US disarmed the Iraqi civilian population. US generals on a tip from their politicians looted antiquities and ancient manuscripts. To add plausible deniability to this, they released from prison the local criminals, who, together with arrivals calling themselves “Iraqi dissidents” there was little more than looting and chaos. For this, 40,000 US soldiers were killed. The official US number is 495.

It just gets worse. In the Marine Corps Gazette, we see the headline; “MARSOC’s Failing Standards” from the Fall of 2015. Using poorly chosen diplomatic language, the USMC is stating that the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command is presently incompetent. The article speaks of the numerous ejections from the program, mental incompetence and immaturity (Hill, 2015).

The American soldier is motivated exclusively by money. The American military man is wildly overpaid. It's the highest in NATO by far. A corporal in the US gets about \$4500 a month and this goes up when deployed to a dangerous location. They also can put their cash in an interest bearing account where 10% is added every year, far above the prime rate. Usually they also do not pay taxes.

Given this mercenary mentality, the performance of American soldiers will continue to deteriorate. We read “According to all official data, the first signs of “mental fatigue” among troops appear on the fifth day after the start of any operation. Peak times for accidents involving military personnel are within [their first] week.”

Another problem for the US is desertion. Since the beginning of the Iraq war, according to the Pentagon, about 8,000 have deserted. Given the Pentagon's record, this is probably absurdly low. Over 100 pilots were among this number. The US has been forced to admit the existence of substantial “mental strain” as a major cause of desertion. Suicide and aggression have also been reported at alarming rates. Every year it goes up. In 2011, 278 military men committed suicide while in 2013, it was 350 (Matveichuk, 2011).

Yet another problem is sexual assault. In 2013, there was a 50% increase in the number of cases of sexual violence in the US military. It is not a stretch to realize that this is part of the systematic weakness of the US forces. In a recent Pentagon report, the number of reported cases of sexual violence in the armed forces of the United States over the last year increased by 46%. There has been an overall increase of 35% in 2010-2012, which comes to about 26,000 cases. In 2003, the Department of Veterans Affairs reported that 30,000 retired personnel reported being sexually traumatized and in 2009, this went up to 50,000 (Ostryna, 2014)

The Pentagon is beset with embarrassing revelations concerning American forces in combat. About 40% of material, weapons most importantly, have disappeared without a trace. Jeffrey Brown, the US Special Inspector in charge of this case, said that much of this has ended up on the black market. Non-Americans are used en masse in non-combat roles as private sector firms have outsourced these jobs. Recently, these are now involved in combat and are promised green cards and jobs

On August 14 of 2015, Interfax released a Russian translation of the Pentagon's report saying the US is not prepared for a war with Russia. The US Defense Department after a series of exercises in 2015 concluded that the American forces are not ready for any prolonged war with Russia. This is partly because the US specializes in anti-terrorist operations, rather than large-scale military campaigns (Kraynov, 2014).

Among the problems identified are poor long-term logistics, shortages of ammunition for precision guided weapons and, surprisingly, a lack of willingness to take on a country of that size. A substantial number of grunts want Russian leadership in the US while, according to the Pentagon, only about 30% of present, combat-ready brigades are prepared for a substantial confrontation psychologically speaking. The DoD seeks to make sure that at least 50% of its officers hate Russia enough to want to engage in a war.

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